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Volume XI JANUARY, 1946 Number 1
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND
THEIR SIGNIFICANCE TO MISSOURI LAWYERS
CARL C. WHEATON*
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, having been tested since Septem-
ber, 1938, in the crucible of litigation, the Supreme Court's Advisory Com-
mittee thereon, in May, 1944, issued a preliminary draft of proposed amend-
ments to these rules. After this draft had been analyzed and criticized by
the legal profession, a second and amended draft was published in May,
1945. It is this second draft which.I shall discuss.
The amendments proposed therein are of peculiar significance to Mis-
souri lawyers, for, if adopted, they not only will affect local practitioners in
their practice in federal courts, but they will also raise the question whether
the corresponding local rules of procedure should be amended.
There follows in their present and amended forms those rules, which it
is proposed should be amended and a discussion of suggested amendments.
Material in the present form of those rules which it is suggested should
be eliminated has been printed in bold face type and enclosed in paren-
theses. Proposed new material is italicized.
RULE 6. TIME.
(b) ENLARGEMENT. When by these rules or by notice
given thereunder or by order of court an act is required or allowed
to be done at or within a specified time, the court for cause shown*
may, at any time in its discretion (1) with or without motion or
notice, order the period enlarged if (application) request therefor
is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or
as extended by a previous order or (2) upon motion made after the
expiration of the specified period permit the act to be done (after
*Professor of Law, University of Missouri, A.B., 1911, Leland Stanford
University, LL.B., 1915, Harvard University. Draftsman for the Missouri Supreme
Court Committee on Civil Practice and Procedure.
(1)
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the expiration of the specified period) where the failure to act
was the result of excusable neglect; but it may not (enlarge the
period) extend the time for taking any action under (Rule 59, ex-
cept as stated in subdivision (e) thereof) Rules 25, 50 (b), 52 (b),
59 (b), (d) and (e), 60 (b), and 73 (a) and (g), except to the
extent and under -the conditions stated in them, (or the period for
an appeal as provided by law.)
(c) UNAFFECTED BY EXPIRATION OF TERM. The
period of time provided for the doing of any act or the taking of any
proceeding is not affected or limited by the continued existence or
expiration of a term of court. The continued existence or expiration
of a term of court in no way affects the power of a court to do any
act or take any proceeding in any civil action which has been pend-
ing before it.
Under this rule, as presently.drafted, the long-standing law that a court
loses jurisdiction to alter its judgments after the expiration of the term at
which they are rendered1 is abrogated and the court is given discretion, even
after the expiration of specified periods prescribed for taking actions, to
allow further time for taking them, except that the times granted within
which to make a motion for a new trial (other than on the ground of newly
discovered evidence) and to take an appeal may not be extended. The re-
sult is that in many instances the finality of judgments may be extended
indefinitely within the discretion of a district court. Thus, it has been held
that a motion under Rule 52 (b) to amend and supplement the findings, if
made with the court's permission after the time allowed by Rule 52 (b)
to make the motion, was timely made and deprived the judgment of the
finality essential to appealability. 2 The same has been held in relation to
motions tardily made under Rule 60 (b) to set aside a default judgment.8
Further, the time permitted by Rule 73 (g) within which to file a record on
appeal has been extended, though the motion to be allowed to file the record
late was not made until after the time for filing provided by the rule had
passed and though no notice was given to the appellee of the motion and
there was no hearing on the motion.'
Though the old rule was considered too narrow, the new rule is be-
lieved unduly to delay the finality of judgments. The suggested remedy for
1. FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) 381-386.
2. Leishman v. Associated Wholesale Electric Co., 318 U.S. 203 (1943).
Coca-Cola Co. v. Busch 7 Fed. Rule Serv. 883 (E.D. Pa. 1943).
3. Schram v. O'Connor, 2 F.R.D. 192 (E.D. Mich. 1941).
4. Ainsworth v. Gill Glass & Fixture Co., 104 F. (2d) 83 (C.C.A. 3d, 1939)
[Vol. 11
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this is to increase the exceptions to the court's discretion to extend times
provided for doing acts and to lengthen any of the excepted periods which
it is believed are too short and to shorten excepted periods which are con-
sidered too long.
Hence, proposed amendments prohibit extension of the period allowed
to substitute parties, 5 to move to have judgment entered in accordance with
a motion for a directed verdict,6 for an amendment of findings or the making
of additional findings after judgment,7 for alteration or amendment of a judg-
ment,8 or for relief from a judgment.9 The exceptions relating to the grant-
ing of a new trial'1 and to the time in which to appeal are retained.1 The
time to move for relief from a judgment has been enlarged from six months
to a year12 and the time in which to appeal has been reduced to 30 days
from the entry of the judgment appealed from except when the United States
is a party in which cases the time allowed is 60 days.13
Other changes in Rule 6 are meant to clarify, rather than to change, it.
Thus, in Rule 6 (b) "request" replaces "application" because an "appli-
cation," according to Rule 7 (b), is made by a motion and the application
referred to in Rule 6 (b) is not a motion.
Inserting, in Rule 6 (b), the words "made after the expiration of the
specified period" after "motion" and eliminating, "after the expiration of
the specified period" after "done" make it clear that the motion to permit
an act to be done after the specified period is to be made after the period
has elapsed.
"Extend the time," which replaces "enlarge the period" in Rule 6 (b), is
thought to relate more closely to both clauses (1) and (2) than does the
deleted phrase. This change may be significant, for I presume that if one
is given further time to act after the period originally granted in which to
act does not enlarge that time.
The phrase "or the period for taking an appeal as provided by law" is
5. Though Rule 25 is not connected with the problem of finality, it is
thought wise to fix a definite limit to the possibility of substituting parties.
6. FED. RULES CIv. PROC., Rule 50 (b).
7. FED. RULES CIV. PRoc., Rule 52 (b).
8. FED. RULES CIV. PROC., Rule 59 (e).
9. FED. RULES Civ. PRoc., Rule 60 (b).
10. FED. RULPS CIv. PROc., Rule 59 (b), (d).
11. FED. RULES CIv. PRoc., Rule 73 (a), (g).
12. FED. RULES Civ. PRoC., Rule 60 (b).
13. FED. RULES CIV. PROC., Rule 73 (a).
1946]
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deleted, since reference is already made in the amended form of this rule
to Rule 73 (a), which states the time within which an appeal must be taken.
The addition to Rule 6 (c) of the words "continued existence" is to make
it clear that, though the time for doink an act elapses before the expiration
of the term at which a case is heard, the court may not extend the periods pro-
vided in the excepted cases referred to in Rule 6 (b). The necessity of this
change is suggested by decisions holding that throughout such term a court
may disturb its judgments. 4
RULE 7. PLEADINGS ALLOWED; FORM OF MOTIONS.
(a) PLEADINGS. There shall be a complaint and an answer;
and there shall be a reply (, if the answer contains) to a counter-
claim denominated as such; an answer to a cross-claim, if the answer
contains a cross-claim; a third-party complaint, if leave is given
under Rule 14 to summon a person who was not an original party;
and there shall be a third-party answer, if a third-party complaint
is served. No other pleading shall be allowed, except that the court
may order a reply to an answer or a third-party answer.
There has been some question as to whether this rule requires or per-
mits a reply to any other part of an answer containing a counterclaim than
to the counterclaim. A comment in Federal Rides Service at pages 672 and
673 says that, though interpreting Rule 7 (a) in the light of Rules 8 (d)
and 12 (a), it seems that one need reply only to the counterclaim, one is
wise to reply to all of the answer containing a counterclaim, since it is not
certain that that is not necessary and the only penalty for the insertion of
the additional portion of the answer would be that it might be stricken.
Judge Wham, in Fort Chartres and Ivy Landing Drainage and Levee
District v. Thompson,'5 held that Rule 7 (a) does not permit a reply to
any part of an answer containing a counterclaim except to the counterclaim.
Rule 7 (a), as amended, clearly provides that the reply shall be only to the
counterclaim unless a court order provides otherwise.
RULE 12. DEFENSES AND OBJECTIONS-WHEN AND
HOW PRESENTED-BY PLEADING OR MOTION-MO-
TION FOR JUDGMENT ON PLEADINGS.
(a) WHEN PRESENTED. A defendant shall serve his an-
swer within 20 days after the service of the summons and complaint
14- Hill v. Hawes, 320 U.S. 520 (1944); Bucy v. Nevada Construction Co.,
125 F. (2d) 213 (C.C.A. 9th, 1942); Boaz v. Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New
York, 146 F. (2d) 321 (C.C.A. 8th, 1944).
15. 4 F.R.D. 369 (E.D. II1. 1945).
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upon him, unless the court directs otherwise when service of process
is made pursuant to Rule 4 (e). A party served with a pleading
stating a cross-claim against him shall serve an answer thereto with-
in 20 days after the service upon him. The plaintiff shall serve his
reply to a counterclaim in the answer within 20 days after service
of the answer or, if a reply is ordered by the court, within 20 days
after service of the order, unless the order otherwise directs. The
United States or an officer or agency thereof shall serve an answer
to the complaint or to a cross-claim, or a reply to a counterclaim,
within 60 days after the service upon the United States attorney
of the pleading in which the claim is asserted. The service of (any)
a motion (provided for in) permitted under this rule alters (the
time fixed by these rules for serving any required responsive
pleading) these periods of time as follows, unless a different time is
fixed by order of the court: (1) if the court denies the motion or
postpones its disposition until the trial on the merits, the respon-
sive pleading (may) shall be served within 10 days after notice of
the court's action; (2) if the court grants a motion for a more defi-
nite statement (or for a bill of particulars,) the responsive plead-
ing (may) shall be served within (ten) 10 days after the service of
the more definite statement (or bill of particulars. In either case
the time for service of the responsive pleading shall not be less
than remains of the time which would have been allowed under
these rules if the motion had not been made.)
(b) HOW PRESENTED. Every defense, in law or fact, to a
-claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-
claim, or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive plead-
ing thereto if one is required, except that the following defenses may
at the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of juris-
diction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the
person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) in-
sufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party.
A motion making any of these defenses shall be made before plead-
ing if a further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is
waived by being joined with one or more other defenses or objec-
tions in a responsive pleading or motion. If a pleading sets forth a
claim for relief to which the adverse party is not required to serve
a responsive pleading, he may assert at the trial any defense in law
or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion under (6) to dismiss
for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and received
by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judg-
inent and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall
1946]
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be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made perti-
nent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(c) MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS.
After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay
the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If,
on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the
pleadings are presented to and received by the court, the motion
shall be treated as one for sumnary judgment and disposed of ax
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable oppor-
tunity to present all material made peftinent to suck a motion by
Rule 56.
(d) PRELIMINARY HEARINGS. The defenses specifically
enumerated (1) (6) (7) in subdivision (b) of this rule, whether
made in a pleading or by motion, and the motion for judgment men-
tioned in subdivision (c) of this rule, shall be heard and determined
before trial on application of any party, unless the court orders that
the hearing and determination thereof be deferred until the trial
(e) MOTION FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT
(OR FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS.) Before responding to,
a pleading (or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these
rules, within 20 days after the service of the pleading upon him,)
a party may move for a more definite statement (, or for a bill of
particulars) of any matter (which is not averred with sufficient
definiteness of ptrticularity to enable him properly to prepare his
responsive pleading or to prepare for trial) where the pleading is
so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably be required,
to frame a responsive pleading. The motion shall point out the de-
fects complained of and the details desired. If the motion is granted
and the order of the court is not obeyed within 10 days after notice
of the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the court
may strike the pleading to which the motion was directed or make
such order as it deems just. (A bill of particulars becomes part
of the pleading which it supplements.)
(f) MOTION TO STRIKE. Upon motion by a party before
responding to a pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted'
by these rules, upon motion made by a party within 20 days after
the service of the pleading upon him or upon the court's own initia-
tive at any time, the court may order stricken from any pleading
any insufficient defense, or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent,.
or scandalous matter (stricken from any pleading.)
(g) CONSOLIDATION OF (MOTIONS) DEFENSES. A
party who makes a motion under this rule may join with it the
other motions herein provided for and then availale to him. If a
party makes a motion under this rule and does not include thereim
[Vol'. lit
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all defenses and objections then available to him which this rule
permits to be raised by motion, he shall not thereafter make a mo-
tion based on any of the defenses or objections so omitted (, except
that prior to making any other motions under this rule he may
make a motion in which are joined all the defenses numbered
(1) to (5) in subdivision (b) of this rule which he cares to as-
sert.)
(h) WAIVER OF DEFENSES. A party waives all defenses
and objections which he does not present either by motion as here-
inbefore provided or, if he has made no motion, in his answer or
reply, except (1) that the defense of failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, the defene of failure to join an indis-
pensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense
to a claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted,
or by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the
merits, and except (2) that, whenever it appears by suggestion of
'the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the sub-
ject matter or that there has been a failure to join an indispensable
party, the court shall dismiss the action. The objection or defense,
if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in Rule 15 (b)
in the light of any evidence that may have been received.
The minor changes in Rule 12 (a) are made to improve the statement
thereof. References to bills of particulars are omitted, since it is proposed
to eliminate such bills by Rule 12 (e). Under (1) and (2) of this rule a
definite period is provided within which one must serve a responsive plead-
ing after a court disposes of a motion permitted under Rule 12. It is pro-
posed that the sentence stating that the time for such service shall not be
less than would be allowed if the motion had not been made be eliminated.
This might shorten the time for service.
The question has arisen as to whether the defense of a failure to join
an indispensable party may be raised by Motion under Rule 12 (b). Some
have thought that the omission of an indispensable party results in a lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter and that the defense of failure to
join an indispensable party may be raised by motion under Rule 12 (b)
(1).'16 The reason for this conclusion is: "Where an indispensable person
is not before it, the court can not adjudicate the controversy because its
action would affect interests over which it does not have jurisdiction."'
16. Hale v. Campbell, 40 F. Supp. 584 (N.D. Iowa, 1941); (1940) 2 Fed.
Rules Serv. 658, (1942) 5 Fed. Rules Serv. 820.
17. Commentary (1940) 2 Fed. Rules Serv. 658, 659.
1946]
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However, this has been doubted.-" To settle the question it is proposed to
add as a seventh ground for motion the failure to join an indispensable
party.
There has been some question as to whether, in case of a motion based
upon the defense that a pleading has failed to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, any extraneous matter, such as affidavits or depositions,
should be allowed to be introduced in support of the motion or in opposi-
tion thereto. Some have felt that such a motion merely supplants a de-
murrer on that ground and that, since so-called speaking demurrers, which
include matter not contained in the pleading demurred to, are improper,
new material not contained in the pleading attacked by a motion under
Rule 12 (b) (6) should not be permitted in support of, or in opposition to,
the motion.
On the other hand, some courts have permitted the use of such ma-
terial.9 In an opinion by Judge Augustus N. Hand of the second circuit, it
was said that a motion to dismiss the complaint, accompanied by an affi-
davit, which in turn was answered by the plaintiff without raising any
miterial issues of fact, might be treated as one for a summary judgment.2 0
The advisory committee has approved this position in a sentence added to
Rule 12 (b). It thus allows one to file a speaking motion to dismiss a com-
plaint, but treats it as a motion for a summary judgment. The committee
emphasizes that material extraneous to the motion is permitted only with
a court's consent, and that, if a motion under Rule 12 (b) (6) is converted
into a motion for a summary judgment, both parties shall be given reason-
able opportunity to submit proofs to avoid taking a person by surprise
through such conversion, and that Rule 56 does not permit a summary
judgment on the merits on affidavits showing a conflict on a material issue
of fact.21
The addition to Rule 12 (c) plays the same role and is based upon the
same reasons as the corresponding sentence added to Rule 12 (b).
Te change from "6" to "7" in Rule 12 (d) is necessitated by the addi-
tion to Rule 12 (b) of a seventh ground for a motion.
18. Shields v. Barrow, 17 How 130 (U.S. 1855); State of Washington v.
United States, 87 F. (2d) 421 (C.C.A. 9th, 1936).
19. Second Preliminary Draft, pp. 12-15,
20. Boro Hall Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 124 F. (2d) 822 (C.C.A. 2d,
1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 695 (1943).
21. Second Preliminary Draft, pp. 13, 15.
[Vol. 11
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The suggested changes in Rule 12 (e) provide for the elimination of
bills of particulars and for the restriction of the use of motions for a more
definite statement to instances where a responsive pleading is permitted.
They may be used only to assist in the preparation of responsive pleadings,
not in the preparation for trial. Hence, the reference to the 20-day time
limit is omitted, since that was inserted to "state a time period where the
motion for a bill is made for the purpose of preparing'for trial."
The advisory committee in suggesting the removal of the provision for
the bill of particulars emphasizes the fact that the free granting by some
courts of extended bills of particulars, which bills become part of the plead-
ings which they supplement, neutralizes Rule 8, which calls for short simple
pleadings and that such lavish use of bills of particulars overlooks the in-
tended use of the rules on depositions and discovery.22 In proposing the
elimination of bills of particulars, the committee follows the suggestion of
the Second Circuit Conference of Circuit and District Judges made in 1940.
Holtzoff refers23 to bills of particulars as a source of delay. Though he
does not advocate their elimination, he thinks that they should be used
only to assist in the preparation of pleadings and that information needed
to prepare for trial should be obtained by interrogatories, discovery, or depo-
sitions. He supports this view by saying that, if, as is provided by Rule
12 (b), a motion for a bill of particulars is appropriate only before joinder
of issue, "It seems premature to afford to a party opportunity to sectife
data that may be needed in preparation for the trial but are not required
to enable him to plead."s 3a
Both Judge Clark and Professor Moore favor the deletion of all of
Rule 12 (e). Clark asserts that pleadings are not the place to obtain'par-
ticularization of the case, but that, if a claim or defense is legally stated,
the matter of particularization should be foregone since ". . . -parties are
protected by discovery, pre-trial, and summary judgment. '24 Moore, in
substance, says the same thing.
2 5
The proposed amendment to Rule 12 (f) fills a need in making it
clear that an insufficient defense may be attacked by a motion to strike
22. Id. at 16-17.
23 HOLTZOFF, NEW FEDERAL PROCEDURE AND THE COURTS (1940) 35-41.
23a. Id. at 36.
24. Clark, Judicial Adinistratwn Monographs, (1942) 6 Fed. Rules Serv.
819, 829-830.
25. 1 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 657 (Cum. Supp. 1945).
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Under the rules as presently drafted no provision is specifically made for
attacking such a defense immediately. As a result, there are various deci-
sions as to how one may attack forthwith the legal insufficiency of a defense.
There are holdings that this may be done by a motion to strike.21 But the
contrary has been held. The reason given for this conclusion in one case
was that Rule 12 (f) applies to claims, not defenses,27 and in another that
the motion to strike was not designed as an instrument to test the legal
sufficiency of a pleading.2 In the latter case it was said that, though the
plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings, which sought a ruling on
the legal sufficiency of certain defenses, would lie, it would have been more
accurately entitled "... objections that the special defenses fail to state
each a legal defense." Still another case decides that the legal insufficiency of
a defense should be attacked by a motion to dismiss.2'
The change in the title to Rule' 12 (g) conforms it to the wording of
the title in Rule 12 (h). The elimination of the exception in Rule 12 (g)
forces one to join in one motion all defenses which may be made under Rule
12, whereas, as the rule now reads, two motions are available, one including
defenses (1) to (5) in Rule 12 (b), and the other including any other de-
fenses and objections available under Rule 12. This should tend to shorten
proceedings.
In Rule 12 (h), the proposed addition to each class of exceptional in-
stances in which defenses are not waived of "failure to join an indispensable
party" indicates that the advisory committee is not certain whether that
defense is an instance of a failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted or of a lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It would
seem preferable to place it in one category or the other.
RULE 13. COUNTERCLAIM AND CROSS-CLAIM.
(a) COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIMS. A pleading shall
state as a counterclaim any claim (, not the subject of a pending
action,) which at the time of (filing) serving the pleading the plead-
26. Gallagher v. Carroll, 27 F. Supp. 568 (E.D. N.Y. 1939); Teiger v.
Stephan Oderwald, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 626 (S.D. N.Y. 1940); Schenley Distillers
Corp. v. Renken, 34 F. Supp. 678 (E.D. S.C. 1940); Teplitzky v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 38 F. Supp. 535 (N.D. Ill. 1941); Yale Transport Corp. v. Yellow Truck &
Coach Mfg. Co., 3 F.R.D. 440 (S.D. N.Y. 1944; Commentary (1939) 1 Fed. Rules
Serv. 669.
27. Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America v. Pan American Airways,
Inc., 58 F. Supp. 338 (S.D. N.Y. 1944).
28. Dysart v. Remington Rand, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 296, 297 (D. Conn. 1939)
29. Eastman Kodak Co. v. McAuley, 2 F.R.D. 21 (S.D. N.Y. 1941).
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er has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction
or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's
claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third
parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, except that
such, a claim need not be so stated if at the time the action was com-
inenced the claim was the subject of another pending action.
(g) CROSS-CLAIM AGAINST CO-PARTY. A pleading may
state as a cross-claim any claim by one party against a co-party
arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject mat-
ter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein or re-
lating -to any property which, may be the subject matter of the
original action. Such cross-claim may include a claim that the party
against whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the cross-claimant
for all or part of a claim asserted in the action against the cross-
claimant.
(i) SEPARATE TRIALS; SEPARATE JUDGMENTS. If the
court orders separate trials as provided in Rule 42 (b), judgment
on a counterclaim or cross-claim may be rendered in accordance
with the terms of Ride 54 (b) when the court has jurisdiction so to
do, even if the claims of the opposing party have been dismissed or
otherwise disposed of.
The suggested substitution in Rule 13 (a) of the word "serving" for
"filing" is proposed to conform the usage in this rule with that throughout the
rules, and particularly with that in Rule 13 (e). "The use of 'filing' was
inadvertent."3 0
Deletion of the words "not the subject of a pending action" and the
addition of the proposed clause found at the end of Rule 13 (a) are in-
tended to make it clear that a claim must be presented by counterclaim,
and may not be submitted as an independent action, unless the claim has
been sued upon before the plaintiff's action was commenced. This would
eliminate the possibility of suing independently on a claim after the com-
mencement of the plaintiff's action but before the serving of the defendant's
answer.31 That such possibility exists under the present wording of this
rule has been pointed out by the United States Court of Appeals of the Dis-
trict of Columbia.3 2
An example of a case covered by the proposed addition to Rule 13 (g)
is a situation in which a second mortgagee is made defendant in a proceeding
30. Second Preliminary Draft, p. 19.
31. Ibid.
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to foreclose the first mortgage. He could file a cross-complaint against the
mortgagor to secure a personal judgment for the indebtedness and to fore-
close his lien. If it were not for the additional phrase, he might not be able-
to do this, since the second mortgagee's claim might well not arise out of
the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the plaintiff's
claim.83 This change might conserve time and money and seems to be ad-
visable.
The additional clause suggested for Rule 13 (e) makes it clear that
judgments on counter claims and cross-claims, when separate trials thereof
are ordered, are to be governed by the terms of Rule 54 (b). At present
there is no such warning.
RULE 14. THIRD-PARTY PRACTICE.
(a) WHEN DEFENDANT MAY BRING IN THIRD PAR-
TY. Before the service of his answer a defendant may move ex
parte or, after the service of his answer, on notice to the plaintiff,
for leave as a third-party plaintiff to serve a summons and complaint
upon a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to
him (or to the plaintiff) for all or part of the plaintiff's claim
against him. If the motion is granted and the summons and com-
plaint are served, the person so served, hereinafter called the third-
party defendant, shall make his defenses to the third-party plain-
tiff's claim as provided in Rule 12 and his counterclaims against
the third-party plaintiff and cross-claims against (the plaintiff, the
third party plaintiff, or any other party) other third-party de-
fendants as provided in Rule 13. The third-party defendant may
assert against the plaintiff any defenses which the third-party plain-
tiff has to the plaintiff's claim. (The third party defendant is
bound by the adjudication of the third party plaintiff's liability
to the plaintiff, as well as of his own to the plaintiff or to the
third party plaintiff.) The third-party defendant may also assert
against the plaintiff any claim he has against him which arises out
of the 'transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
plaintiff's claim against the third-party plaintiff. The plaintiff may
(amend his pleadings to) assert against the third-party defendant
any claim (which the plaintiff might have asserted against the
third party defendant had he been joined originally as a defend-
ant.) he has against him which arises out of the transaction or oc-
currence that is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim against
the third-party plaintiff and the third-party defendant thereupon
shall assert his defenses as provided in Rile 12 and his counterclaim
33. Second Preliminary Draft, p. 19.
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and cross-claim as provided in Rule 13. A third-party defendant
may proceed under this rule against any person 'not a party to the
action who is or may be liable to him (or to the third party plain-
tiff) for all or part of the claim made in the action against the third-
party defendant.
The deletion of "or to the plaintiff" in the first sentence of this rule
and of "or to the third party plaintiff" in the last sentence thereof is based
upon the fact that those phrases are futile in most instances. One reason
for this is that, if the third-party defendant's liability, if any, is to the
plaintiff, rather than to the defendant, the plaintiff is not compelled to
proceed against such third-party defendant. 34 Further, according to the
majority view, the plaintiff can not amend his complaint and sue a third-
party defendant unless he could have sued him originally. Very often
he could not have done this because of lack of diversity of citizenship. Hence,
the offer by the defendant of the third party as a defendant may be ineffec-
tive and time-consuming.
Under such circumstances, the usual rule is that an order granting
leave to bring in third-party defendants3" or bringing them in 3 7 is vacated,
and a motion to add a third-party defendant is denied.3 8
The suggested changes in the second and third sentences of Rule 14
(a) state more accurately the third-party defendant's right to present de-
fenses than it is now stated.
The new sentence giving the third-party defendant the right to assert
against the plaintiff any claim which he has against the latter and which
arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
plaintiff's claim is inserted so that all claims arising therefrom may be
34. See authorities in notes 35, 36, 37 infra.
35. People of State of Illinois, for use of Trust Co. of Chicago v. Maryland
Casualty Co., 132 F. (2d) 850 (C.C.A. 7th, 1942); Hoskie v. Prudential Ins. Co.
of America, 39 F. Supp. 305 (E.D. N.Y. 1941); Herrington v. Jones, 2 F.R.D.
108 (E.D. La. 1941); Johnson v. G. J. Sherrard Co., 2 F.R.D. 164 (D. Mass.
1941); Thompson v. Cranston, 2 F.R.D. 270 (W.D. N.Y. 1942); Banks v. Employers'
Liability Assurance Corp., 7 Fed. Rules Serv. 271 (W.D. Mo. 1943); Commentary
(1942) 6 Fed. Rules Serv. 766.
36. Delano v. Ives, 40 F. Supp. 672 (E.D. Pa. 1941); Whitmire v. Partin,
2 F.R.D. 83 (E.D. Tenn. 1941); Roadway Express, Inc. v. Automobile Ins. Co.
of Hartford, Conn., 8 Fed. Rules Serv. 265 (N.D. Ohio 1945).
37. Satink v. Holland Township, 31 F. Supp. 229 (D N.J. 1940).
38. Connelly v. Bender, 36 F. Supp. 368 (E.D. Mich. 1941). It is said in
an article by Lawrence Koenigsberger, Suggestions for Changes in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 Fed. Rules Serv. 1010, 1012; that ". . . no useful
purpose is served by permitting a defendant to make suggestions to the plaintiff
in regard" to who shall be defendants.
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heard and determined in the same action. As a corollary to this, the plain-
tiff, in a new phrase, is given the right to assert claims against a third-
party defendant which arise out of that transaction or occurrence, and the
defendant is, in fairness, allowed to present defenses, counterclaims, and
cross-claims in connection with this claim of the plaintiff. There seems to
be an inconsistency between the fourth and fifth sentences of the proposed
rule. In the fourth sentence the third-party defendant may assert against
the plaintiff only those claims arising out of the transaction or occurrence
which is the subject of the plaintiff's claim, whereas in the fifth sentence
he is granted counterclaims provided in Rule 13. This rule allows per-
missive counterclaims against an opposing party not arising out of such
transaction or occurrence.
The fourth sentence of the present rule is deleted as it is believed to
relate to substantive law. This action is proper.
RULE 17. PARTIES PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT; CA-
PACITY.
(b) CAPACITY TO SUE OR BE SUED. The capacity of an
individual, other than one acting in a representative capacity, to sue
or be sued shall be determined by the law of his domicile. The capa-
city of a corporation to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law
under which it was organized. In all other cases capacity to sue or
be sued shall be determined by the law of the state in which the
district court is held, except (1) that a partnership or other un-
incorporated association, which has no such capacity by the law
of such state, may sue or be sued in its common name for the pur-
pose of enforcing for or against it a substantive right existing under
the Constitution or laws of the United States, and except (2) that
the capacity of a receiver appointed by a court of the United States
to sue or be sited in a court of the United States is governed by
Rule 66.
The new provision in this rule merely makes clear that the capacity
of a federal receiver to sue or be sued in a federal court is determined by
Rule 66 infra.
There is a question whether the provision of Rule 23 (b) that, in an
action brought to enforce a secondary right on the part of one or more share-
holders in an association, the complaint shall aver that the plaintiff was a
shareholder at the time of the transaction of which he complains or that
his share devolved on him by operation of law deals with substantive or
procedural law. The advisory committee believes that this matter should
[Vol. 11
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be decided by the Supreme Court when a case is presented to it, not ex pafte
when it is asked to pass on the advisability of amending rules of procedure.
Hence no change in this rule is suggested. If the Court decides that this
provision deals with a substantive right, it is suggested that there should
be added to Rule 23 (b) (1) a provision that it does not apply in juris-
dictions where state law permits a shareholder to maintain a secondary
action, although he was not a shareholder at the time of the transaction
of which he complains3 9
RULE 24. INTERVENTION.
(a) INTERVENTION OF RIGHT. Upon timely applica-
tion anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when
a statute of the United States confers an unconditional right to in-
tervene; or (2) when the representation of the applicant's interest
by existing parties is or may be inadequate and the applicant is or
may be bound by a judgment in the action; or (3) when the appli-
cant is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or
other disposition of property in the custody of, or subject to tie
control of or disposition by, the court or an officer thereof.
(b) PERMISSIVE INTERVENTION. Upon timely appli-
cation anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action: (1)
when a statute of the United States confers a conditional right to
intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claims or defense and the
main action have a question of law or fact in common. And when-
ever a party to an action relies for ground of claim or defense upon
any statute or executive order, administered by a federal or state
governmental agency, or upon any regulation, order, requirement,
or agreement issued or made pursuant to the statute or executive
order, the agency upon timely application may be permitted to in-
tervene in the action. In exercising its discretion the court shall con-
sider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties.
The addition to Rule 24 (a) covers the situation where the court does
not have actual custody of property but where it has the control or disposi-
tion thereof. This addition seems logical, for there is no reason to distinguish
between the case in which a court has custody of property and that in which
it lacks custody, but has control.
The commendable purpose of the additional sentence in Rule 24 (b)
which permits government agencies to intervene is to avoid narrow con-
39. Second Preliminary Draft, pp. 24-30.
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structions of the rule as presently drafted when such agencies ask leave
to intervene.40
RULE 26. DEPOSITIONS PENDING ACTION.
(a) WHEN DEPOSITIONS MAY BE TAKEN. (By leave
of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant
or over property which is the subject of the action or without
such leave after an answer has been served, the testimony of
any person, whether a party or not, may be taken at the instance
of any party by deposition upon oral examination or written in-
terrogatories for the purpose of discovery or for use as evidence
in the action or for both purposes.) Any party may take the testi-
mony of any person, including a party, by deposition upon oral
examination or written interrogatories for the purpose of discovery
or for use as evidence in the action or for both purposes. A deposi-
tion may be taken after commencement of the action and without
leave of court, except that if notice of -the taking is served within
20 days after suck commencement leave of court granted with or
without notice must first be obtained. The attendance of witnesses
may be compelled by the use of subpoena as provided in Rule 45.
Depositions shall be taken only in accordance with these rules.
The deposition of a person confined in prison may be taken only by
leave of court on such terms as the court prescribes.
(b) SCOPE OF EXAMINATION. Unless otherwise or-
dered by the court as provided by Rule 30 (b) or (d), the deponent
may be examined regarding any matter, not privileged, which is
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action,
whether (relating) it relates to the claim or defense of the examin-
ing party or to the claim or defense of any other party, including
the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and location
of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity
and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts. It is not
ground for objection that the testimony will be inadmissable at the
trial if the testimony sought appears reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissable evidence.
Under Rule 26 (a) one must to-day obtain leave of court to take a
deposition prior to answer. This requirement having been objected to by
numerous district judges as a time-consuming application which is usually
granted as a matter of course, the advisory committee, in the first draft
40. An example of such construction in connection with a request by the
Office of Price Administration to intervene in a bankruptcy proceeding to protest
the sale of assets above ceiling prices is found in the decision in In Re Bender Body
Co., 47 F. Supp. 224 (N.D. Ohio, 1942).
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of proposed amendments to the federal rules of civil procedure, provided
for the taking of depositions without leave of" court after the commence-
ment of an action. 41 However, in its second draft, it requires leave of court
if notice of taking of a deposition is served within 20 days after com-
mencement of the action. This is said to be to protect parties against
abuse.42 In the first draft Rules 30 and 31 were thought to give ample
protection. 43 The suggested amendment as it now reads appears to change
but slightly the rule as presently drafted. To-day one need not ask leave
to take a deposition after an answer is served, and Rule 12 (a) provides
that a "defendant shall serve his answer within 20 days after the service
of the summons and complaint upon him, unless the court directs other-
wise when service of process is made pursuant to Rule 4 (e)."
The scope of examination permitted under the present form of Rule
26 (b) is unsettled. True, it has been held that ". . . examination before
trial may be had not merely for the purpose of producing evidence to be
used at the trial, but also for discovery of evidence, indeed, for leads as
to where evidence may be located,"44 and that it allows ". . . examination
into matters which may not be admissible in evidence." 45 It has also been
said that this rule contemplates ". . . the broad discovery of information
which may be useful in preparation for trial ."4  On the other hand it has
been decided that the ". . . test whether an examination before trial shall
be permitted is, whether or not the testimony would be admissible upon the
trial of the action."47
The proposed new sentence would settle this controversy in favor of
the broader rule. This seems advisable, since one purpose of discovery is
to aid in making adequate preparation for trial.
41. First Preliminary Draft, p. 37.
42. Second Preliminary Draft, p. 33. In both of the drafts of proposed
amendments, § 1917 of the Mo. REV. STAT. (1939) is referred to as an example
of the type of rule which is aimed at in those drafts.
43. Second Preliminary Draft, pp. 38-39.
44. Engl v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.., 139 F. (2d) 469, 472 (C.C.A. 2d, 1943).
45. Ibid.
46. Lewis v. United Air Lines Transportation Corp., 27 F. Supp. 946, 947
(D. Conn. 1939).
47. Benevento v. A. & P. Food Stores, Inc., 26 F. Supp. 424 (E.D. N.Y.
1939). See Poppino v. Jones Store Co., 3 Fed. Rules Serv. 325 (W.D. Mo. 1940)
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RULE 27. DEPOSITIONS BEFORE ACTION OR PENDING
APPEAL.
(a) BEFORE ACTION.
(3) Order and examination. If the court is satisfied that the
perpetuation of the testimony may prevent a failure or delay of
justice, it shall make an order designating or describing the per-
sons whose depositions may be taken and specifying the subject
matter of the examination and whether the depositions shall be
taken upon oral examination or written interrogatories. The
depositions may then be taken in accordance with these rules; and
the court may make an order of the character provided for by
Rules 34 and 35, or either of them. For the purpose of applying
these rules to depositions for perpetuating testimony, each refer-
ence therein to the court in which the action is pending shall be
deemed to refer to the court in which the petition for such depo-
sition was filed.
(b) PENDING APPEAL. If an appeal as been taken from
a judgment of a district court or before the taking of an appeal
if the time therefor has not expired, the district court in which
the judgment was rendered may allow the taking of depositions of
witnesses to perpetuate their testimony for use in the event of
further proceedings in the district court. In such case the party
who desires to perpetuate the testimony may make a motion in the
district court for leave to take the depositions, upon the same
notice and service thereof as if the action was pending in the
district court. The motion shall show (1) the names and addresses
of persons to be examined and the substance of the testimony
which he expects to elicit from each; (2) the reasons for perpetuat-
ing their testimony. If the court finds that the perpetuation of
the testimony is proper to avoid a failure or delay of justice, it
may make an order allowing the depositions to be taken and may
make an order of. the character provided for by Rules 34 and 35
or either of them, and thereupon the depositions may be taken and
used in the same manner and under the same conditions as are
prescribed in these rules for depositions taken in actions pending
in the district court.
It is thought by the advisory committee that the language of the
present form of these rules might be interpreted to bar procedure under
Rules 34 and 35 when one wishes to perpetuate testimony.48 The suggested
additions to Rule 27 make clear that the former rules may be applied in
proceedings to perpetuate testimony. Fairness requires that one should
48. Second Preliminary Draft, p. 36.
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be accorded the same opportunity to prepare for the trial of a case which
may be commenced as to prepare for one which has been begun.
RULE 28. PERSONS BEFORE WHOM DEPOSITIONS MAY
BE TAKEN.
(a) WITHIN THE UNITED STATES. Within the United
States or within a territory or insular possession subject to the
dominion of the United States, depositions shall be taken before
an officer authorized to administer oaths by the laws of the United
States or of the place where the examination is held, or before a
person appointed by the court in which, the action is pending and
such person by virtue of the appointment shall have power to
administer oaths and take testimony.
The purpose of the suggested addition to this rule is to facilitate the
taking of depositions. In isolated localities it may be difficult to find one
authorized by federal or local law to take depositions. The same might
be true where officers otherwise available were incapacitated or on vacation.
Further, a master appointed by the court could take depositions any-
where,49 thus eliminating the necessity of using numerous officers whose
territorial authority is limited. This change would be commendable.
RULE 30. DEPOSITIONS UPON ORAL EXAMINATION.
(b) ORDERS FOR THE PROTECTION OF PARTIES
AND DEPONENTS. After notice is served for taking a depo-
sition by oral examination, upon motion seasonably made by any
party or by the person to be examined and upon notice for and
good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending may
make an order that the deposition shall not be taken, or that it
may be taken only at some designated time or place other than
that stated in the notice, or that it may be taken only on written
interrogatories, or that certain matters shall not be inquired into,
or that the scope of the examination shall be limited to certain
matters, or that designated restrictions be imposed upon inquiry
into papers and documents prepared or obtained by the adverse
party in the preparation of the case for trial, or that the examination
shall be held with no one present except the parties to the action
and their officers or counsel, or that after being sealed the deposition
shall be opened only by order of the court, or that secret processes,
developments, or research need not be disclosed, or that the
49. A Master may take depositions outside of the district of his appoint-
ment. Consolidated Fastener Co. v. Columbian Button & Fastener Co., 85 Fed. 54
(C.C. N.D. N.Y. 1898); Mathieson Alkali Works v. Arnold, Hoffman & Co., 31
F. (2d) 1 (C.C.A. 1st, 1929).
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parties shall simultaneously file specified documents or information
enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by the court;
or the court may make any other order which justice requires to
protect the party or witness from annoyance, expense, embarrass-
ment, or oppression.
The addition of the words "time or" makes it clear that protective
orders authorized by this rule extend to matters of time as well as place,
whereas the omission of those words from the present form of the rule
may imply that a court can not order a deposition taken at a time other
than that mentioned in the notice. The suggested change would be
salutary.
The addition to this rule of a provision that a court may restrict the
inquiry into writings prepared, or obtained by an adverse party in the
preparation of a case for trial, without including in the rule any standard
by which the court's action shall be governed, other than that good cause
for such action must be shown is objected to by some. Thus, Walter P. Arm-
strong, a former president of the American Bar Association, contends that
the advisory committee should have acted more daringly and stated what
writings of this type could, or could not, be examined. He believes that
past performances of courts prove that they will not exercise any discretion
in permitting or refusing parties the right to inspect such writings, but
that they will either allow one to view all such documents or will deny
the right to inspect any of them."0 The Committee, on the other hand,
wants to make it clear that in some, but not in all, instances such papers
may be examined, and that it believes that the courts can be relied upon
properly to restrict the use of the right of inspection of writings gathered
in the course of the preparation of a case for trial. The committee promises
careful consideration of any standard for the exercise of discretion which
may be suggested. Certainly it should be possible to depend on courts to
act with discretion, rather than arbitrarily, in this matter. In using such
discretion they surely would apply the only logical standard of action,
which is that the granting of a demand for disclosure should be reasonable.
Under the circumstances, Mr. Armstrong's suggestion that a list of writings
to be disclosed should be included in the rule seems impracticable. It would
make the rule too inelastic.
The addition of the word "expense" is commendable as it makes
50. Armstrong, Second Draft of Proposed Amendments to Federal Rides
Civ. Proc. (1945) 31 A.B.A.J. 497.
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clear that a party or witness may be protected against undue expenditure
in connection with the taking of a deposition. However, it might have
been better to have provided that the court might make "any other order
which justice requires to protect the party or witness" rather than to add
a provision as to particular kind of order. Since the item of expense was
not thought of when the rule was originally drafted, it may be that some-
thing else necessary for the reasonable protection of parties and witnesses
has still been forgotten.
RULE 33. INTERROGATORIES TO PARTIES.
Any party may serve upon any adverse party written inter-
rogatories to be answered by the party served or, if the party served
is a public or private corporation or a partnership or association,
by any officer thereof competent to testify in its behalf. Interroga-
tories may be served after commencement of the action and without
leave of court, except that if service is made within 20 days after
suck commencement leave of court granted with or without notice
must first be obtained. The interrogatories shall be answered separ-
ately and fully in writing under oath. The answers shall be signed
by the person making them; and the party upon whom the inter-
rogatories have been served shall serve a copy of the answers on the
party submitting the interrogatories within 15 days after the (de-
livery) service of the interrogatories, unless the court, on motion
and notice and for good cause shown, enlarges or shortens the time.
(Objections to any interrogatories may be presented to the
court within 10 days after service thereof, with notice as in case
of a motion; and) Within 10 days after service of interrogatories
a party may serve written objections thereto together with. a notice
of motion setting the objecions down for he earliest practicable hear-
ing. Answers to interrogatories to which objection is made shall
be deferred until the objections are determined (, which shall be
at as early a time as pacticable. No party may, without leave
of court, serve more than one set of interrogatories to be an-
swered by the same party.)
Interrogatories may relate to any matters which can be in-
quired into under Rule 26 (b); and the answers may be used to the
same extent as provided in Rule 26 (d) for the use of the deposition
of a party. Interrogatories may be served after a deposition has been
taken, or a deposition may be sought after interrogatories have been
answered but the court, on motion of the deponent or the party in-
terrogtted, may make such protective order as justice may require.
The number of interrogatories or of sets of interrogatories to be
served is not limited except as justice requires to protect the party
from annoyance, expense, embarrassment, or oppression. The court
19461
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in ruling on objections to interrogatories nay inake any order speci-
fied in Rule 30 (b) which is appropriate and just.
The added second sentence in the first paragraph of this rule, as amended
above, is intended to provide for a practice similar to that suggested in con-
nection with Rule 26 (a) and to avoid litigation as to the necessity of ob-
taining leave of court to serve interrogatories.51 Mr. Armstrong suggests
that this proposed addition to this rule would occasionally result in in-
equality of operation, since the filing of a complaint (commencement of an
action -52) may occur more than twenty (20) days before the service of the
complaint. Hence one might be served with interrogatories without having
learned of the filing of the complaint and he would be obliged to deal with
interrogatories without preparation, if the interrogatories are not to be
served until more than twenty (20) days after the commencement of the
action, as no notice of intent to serve interrogatories is necessary prior to
the service thereof. He says that this objection to the proposal could be
overcome by providing for allowing service of interrogatories without leave
of court only after 20 days after service of the complaint." There is sub-
stance to this objection.
The word "service" is substituted for "delivery" to conform this rule
to the use of the word elsewhere in this rule and in other rules.
54
The proposed new wording of the provisions relating to the taking of
objections to interrogatories is intended to clarify the practice relating
thereto. The interjection of the words "to interrogatories to which objection
is made" is designed to provide that only the answers to objectionable in-
terrogatories may be deferred and that other interrogatories shall be an-
swered within the time prescribed by the rule. This eliminates the right
to delay answers to all interrogatories by objecting to some of them and
should expedite interrogatory procedure and do away with the strike value
of objections to minor interrogatories. 5
The proposed new paragraph, if adopted, would properly make clear
that interrogatories may be as broad as deposition questions and that they,
and the answers thereto, may be used to the same extent as depositions.
Under the present form of this rule, some courts have unduly narrowed the
51. Second Preliminary Draft, p. 42.
52. FED. RULEs Cry. PRoc., Rule 3.
53. Armstrong, Second Draft of Proposed Amendments to Federal Rides of
Civil Procedure (1945) 31 A.B.A.J. 497, 499.
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scope of interrogatories. Thus, it has been held that interrogatories shall
be limited to matter which may be produced in evidence at the trial;50 that
they may not relate to an ultimate issue; 57 that they should be relatively
few and should relate two important facts of the case;58 and that interroga-
tories calling for opinions are improper. 9 Further, at times a narrow view
has been taken of the use of interrogatories. For example, it has been de-
cided that interrogatories cannot be introduced and read in evidence, as,
contrary to the terms of Rule 26 (d), there is no express provision for that
practice in Rule 33."
The second sentence of the suggested paragraph makes certain that,
if adopted, interrogatories could, without leave of court, be served after
a deposition had been taken and vice versa. It has been held that, under
the present form of this rule, interrogatories can -not be thus served, for
such service would be analogous to the service of a second set of interroga-
tories. Technically this is incorrect. There is nothing in the rules as now
written to prevent the proposed practice, but to state specifically that it
is permissible will avoid litigation. As stated by the advisory committee,
it may be desirable to elicit, by the inexpensive method of interrogatories,
necessary information not obtained by deposition.
61
The policy of permitting, in general, but one set of interrogatories is
changed by the third sentence of the proposed new paragraph for this rule.
By it the party interrogated would have the burden of showing the necessity
for a limitation on the number of sets of interrogatories which he must
answer, whereas at present the party requesting the right to propound addi-
tional interrogatories has the burden of convincing the court that he should
be given that right. There is at least one substantial objection to the sug-
gested practice. It may lead to lack of thoroughness in the preparation of the
original set of interrogatories. The cases which 'the advisory committee
56. Ayer v. Hershey Creamery Co., 1 F.R.D. 14 (D.N.J. 1939); Fisher v.
Taylor, 1 F.R.D. 448 (E.D. Tenn. 1940).
57. Tudor v. Leslie, 1 F.R.D. 448 (D. Mass. 1940).
58. Coca Cola Co. v. Dixi-Cola Laboratories, 30 F. Supp. 275 (D. Md.
1939); Knox v. Alter, 2 F.R.D. 337 (W.D. Pa. 1942). See, Holtzoff, Instrwments
of Discovery Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1942) 41 MIcH. L. REv.
205, 216-217.
59. Coca Cola Co. v. Dixi-Cola Laboratories, 30 F. Supp. 275 (D. Md.
1939); Byers Theaters Inc. v. Murphy, 1 F.R.D. 286 (W.D. Va. 1940); J.
Schoeneman, Inc. v. Brauer, 1 F.R.D. 292 (W.D. Mo. 1940).
60. Bailey v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 1 F.R.D. 494 (S.D. Cal 1940).
61. Second Preliminary Draft, p. 44.
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cites in support of its proposed change of policy merely state that the num-
bers of pertinent interrogatories propounded is unimportant. This conclusion
appears to have been reached in connection with initial interrogatories.02
These decisions do not, therefore, support the committee's conclusion that
there should be a change of policy in connection with multiple sets of in-
terrogatories.
It should be noticed that the last sentence of the proposed new para-
graph provides for the same possible orders in connection with interrogatories
as are provided by Rule 30 (b) in relation to depositions. This is proper,
because of the similarity of interrogatories and depositions.
RULE 34. DISCOVERY AND PRODUCTION OF DOCU-
MENTS AND THINGS FOR INSPECTION, COPY-
ING, OR PHOTOGRAPHING.
Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor and
upon notice to all other parties, and subject to any applicable pro-
tective orders mentioned in Rule 30 (b), the court in which an
action is pending may (1) order any party to produce and permit
the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the
moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books,
accounts, letters, photographs, objects, or tangible things, not priv-
iliged, which constitute or contain evidence (material to any
matter involved in the action) relating to any of the matters with-
in the scope of the examination permitted by Rule 26 (b) and
which are in his possession, custody, or control; or (2) order any
party to permit entry upon designated land or other property in his
possession or control for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, sur-
veying, or photographing the property or any designated (relevant)
object or operation thereon within the scope of the examination per-
mitted by Rile 26 (b). The order shall specify the time, place, and
manner of making the inspection and taking the copies and photo-
graphs and may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just.
The purposes of the suggested changes in this rule are plain and com-
mendable. The initial innovation provides for the same protective orders
in connection with discovery under this section as is furnished in connection
with depositions under Rule 30. The last two changes correlate the scope
of inquiry permitted under this rule with that provided in Rule 26 (b) in
connection with depositions pending an action.3
62. J. Schoeneman, Inc. v. Brauer, 1 F.R.D. 292 (W.D. Mo. 1940); Canuso
v. City of Niagara Falls, 8 Fed. Rules Serv. 618 (W.D. N.Y. 1945).
63. Second Preliminary Draft, pp. 45-46.
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RULE 36. ADMISSION OF FACTS AND OF GENUINENESS
OF DOCUMENTS.
(a) REQUEST FOR ADMISSION. (At any time after the
pleadings are closed, a) A party may serve upon any other party
a written request for the admission by the latter of the genuine-
ness of any relevant documents described in and exhibited with
the request or of the truth of any relevant matters of fact set forth
(therein.) in the request. A request may be served after the com-
mencement of the action and without leave of court, except that if
service is made within 20 days after such commencement leave of
court granted with or without ndtice must first be obtained. Copies
of the documents shall be (delivered) served with the request un-
less copies have already been furnished. Each of the matters of
which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted unless,
within a period designated in the request, not less than 10 days
after service thereof or within such (further) shorter or longer time
as the court may allow on motion and notice, the party to whom
the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the admis-
sion either (1) a sworn statement (either) denying specifically the
matters of which an admission is requested or setting forth in de-
tail the reasons why he cannot truthfully (either) admit or deny
those matters, or (2) written objections to the request, in whole or
in part, on the ground that some or all of the requested admissions
are privileged or irrelevant, or the request, in whole or in part, is
otherwise improper, together with a notice of motion setting the
objections down for the earliest practicable hearing. If written ob-
jections to a part of the request are made, the remainder of the re-
quest shall be answered within the period designated in the request.
All denials shall fairly meet the substance of the matters denied and
when good faith requires that a party deny only a part or a qualifi-
cation of a matter of which an admission is requested, he shall speci-
fy so much of it as is true and shall deny only the remainder.
The first proposec" deletion in this rule, together with the initial new
sentence suggested, would change the present practice which permits one,
without leave of court, to request admissions at any time after pleadings
are closed to one which would allow such request to be made at any time
after the commencement of an action.04 No leave of court would be required
as a condition to making such request, unless service was to be made within
twenty (20) days after filing of a complaint.
The suggested substitution of the words "in the request" for the word
64. By Rule 3 an action is commenced by filing a complaint
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"therein" at the end of the first sentence of this rule makes it clear that
one may request the admission of the truth of facts not found in documents
described in a request for admissions. It has been argued that, under the
present wording of the rule, this can not be done, because "therein" refers
to "documents" rather than to "request." 65
The substitution of "served" for "delivered" conforms the use of words
in this rule to their use in the rules generally. And the substitution of
"shorter or longer" for "further" properly permits a court to shorten, as well
as to lengthen, the time stated in a request for admissions within which one
must act in order that he shall not be deemed to have made admissions.
The rule in its present form merely permits one to deny matters of
which an admission is requested or to give reasons why one cannot truth-
fully admit or deny those matters. It makes no provision for objecting to
the requests for admissions, though the rule clearly provides that one need
not admit irrelevant matters. It also seems that there may be other effective
objections to making admissions such as that the matters involved are
privileged. This failure to specify a method of attacking a notice to admit
facts has been unfortunate. Courts have held that one may not make an
interlocutory motion to strike a request, though the matters concerning
which motions are requested are irrelevant or privileged.00 The result is
that one must either make admissions or reach the same result by remaining
silent, deny the facts involved, or state reasons why he cannot truthfully
admit or deny those facts. Especially where the facts in question are privi-
leged, though true and material, one requested to admit them is "on a
spot." He will not wish to admit the facts. He cannot deny them without
subjecting himself to costs under Rule 37 (c). Though it has been held
that, if a request "is directed to irrelevant private matters or violates con-
stitutional rights" there is good reason why one cannot admit or deny the
matters in question,6 7 this position seems untenable. There is no reason why
one can not admit or deny such matters, though there is reason why he
should not be required to do so. The proposed amendment contained in
65. Smith v. Kaufman, 114 F. (2d) 40, 42 (C.C.A. 2d, 1940), and authorities
cited therein. However, the court rejected this argument.
66. Momand v. Paramount Pictures Distributing Co., 36 F. Supp. 568, 573
(D. Mass. 1941) and cases cited therein. See also, Commentaries (1939) 1 Fed.
Rules Serv 684-686, (1939) 2 Fed. Rules Serv. 670, and (1942) 5 Fed. Rules
Serv. 835-837.
67. Modern Food Process Co. v. Chester Packing & Provision Co., 30 F.
Supp. 520 (E.D. Pa. 1939).
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the provisions added to Rule 36 (a) supplies a method of attacking im-
proper requests for admissions without delaying answers to unobjection-
able requests. Further, in conformance with Rule 8 (b), it justly makes any
denial accurately reflect the position of the party answering a request for
admissions. 8
RULE 41. DISMISSAL OF ACTIONS.
(a) VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL: EFFECT THEREOF.
(1) By Plaintiff; By Stipulation. Subject to the provisions of
Rule 23 (c), Rule 66, and of any statute of the United States, an ac-
tion may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court (i) by
filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service of the answer
or (ii) by filing a stipulation or dismissal signed by all the parties
who have appeared generally in the action. Unless otherwise stated
in the notice or dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is without
prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudi-
cation upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dis-
missed in any court of the United States or of any state an action
based on or including the same claim.
(b) INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL: EFFECT THEREOF.
For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these rules
or any order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an
action or of any claim against him. After the plaintiff has completed
the presentation of his evidence, the defendant, without waiving
his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted,
may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and
the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. In an action tried
by the court, without a jury, the court as trier of the facts may then
determine them and render judgment against the plaintiff or may
decline to render any judgment until the close of all the evidence.
If the court renders judgment against the plaintiff, the court shall
make findings as provided in Rule 52 (a). Unless the court in its
order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this sub-
division and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than
a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue, operates
as an adjudication upon the merits.
The addition of "Rule 66" in Rule 4 1 (a) will be necessary, if, as sug-
gested, the former rule is amended to include a provision concerning the
dismissal of actions in which a receiver has been appointed.
The present wording of Rule 41 (b) relating to a defendant's motion
to dismiss after the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence
68. Second Preliminary Draft, p. 48.
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in a non-jury case had led to different interpretations thereof. Thus, in
the third circuit it has been decided that, in such a case, no findings of fact
are required. One reason given for this conclusion is that this situation is
-not covered by Rule 52 (a), which requires the finding of facts only in
cases in which all of the evidence has been presented prior to motion.0' The
other reason given is that a motion for an order of dismissal is the equiva-
lent of a motion for a "directed verdict" and that all the court need do is
to determine whether the plaintiff's evidence and the inferences reasonably
to be drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plain-
tiff, are sufficient to support a judgment in favor of the plaintiff.70 This
view seems to find support in a note of the advisory committee which was
published in connection with the rule when it was presented to the Supreme
Court for adoption. The note read, in part: "It (Rule 41 (b)) also provides
in actions tried without a jury for the equivalent of a directed verdict in
actions tried by a jury as provided in Rule 50 (Motion for Directed Ver-
dict)."
In the sixth, seventh, and ninth circuits it has been held that, when
a court tries a case without a jury, it should, on a motion for dismissal at
the close of the plaintiffff's evidence, decide the facts against the defendant,
if it believes that the facts are against him, though the plaintiff's evidence
would take the case to the jury.71 The reason given for this conclusion is
that Rule 52 (a) requires that in all cases tried without a jury the facts
must be decided.72 Professor Moore agrees with this view, since Rule 41 (b)
provides that the rrotion for a dismissal is upon the facts as well as upon
the law.73 This argument has been pressed in the third circuit. The answer
of the court was that "the facts" referred to in that rule are the prima fade
facts shown by the plaintiff's evidence in the light most favorable to him
and that no weighing of the evidence is contemplated by the rule.
The new sentences which the committee proposes should be added to
Rule 41 (b) would make it clear that the present majority rule should pre-
69. Schad v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 136 F. (2d) 991, 993
(C.C.A. 3rd, 1943).
70. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Mason, 115 F. (2d) 548 (C.C.A.
3d, 1940).
71. Young v. United States, 111 F. (2d) 823 (C.C.A. 9th, 1940); Gary
Theater Co. v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 120 F. (2d) 891 (C.C.A. 7th, 1941);
Bach v. Friden Calculating Machine Co., 148 F. (2d) 407 (C.C.A. 6th, 1945).
72. Ibid.
73. 3 MOORE FEDERAL PRAcTicE 52 (Cum. Supp. 1945).
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vail to the extent that the court, on a motion to dismiss, may decide the
facts against the plaintiff, though the case is one that might go to a jury.
Though, as pointed out by the third circuit, there are substantial arguments
against the rule adopted in the suggested amendments, there are equally
strong arguments in its favor. One not mentioned above is that it would
expedite the trial of cases. And it would be well to have the controvrsy
settled.
RULE 45. SUBPOENA.
(b) FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTARY EVI-
DENCE. A subpoena may also command the person to whom it is
directed to produce the books, papers, documents, or tangible things
designated therein; but the court, upon motion made promptly and
in any event at or before the time specified in the subpoena for com-
pliance therewith, may (I) quash or modify the subpoena if it is un-
reasonable and oppressive or (2) condition denial of the motion
upon the advancement by the person in whose behalf the subpoena
is issued of the reasonable cost of producing the books, papers, docu-
ments, or tangible things.
(d) SUBPOENA FOR TAKING DEPOSITIONS: PLACE
OF EXAMINATION.
(1) Proof of-service of a notice to take a deposition as pro-
vided in Rules 30 (a) and 31 (a) constitutes a sufficient authoriza-
tion for the issuance by the clerk of the district court for the district
in which the deposition is to be taken of subpoenas for the persons
named or described therein. (A subpoena commanding the pro-
duction of documentary evidence on the taking of a deposition
shall not be used without an order of the court.) The subpoena
may command the person to Whom it is directed to produce desig-
nated books, papers, documents, or tangible -things which, constitute
or contain evidence relating to any of the matters within the scope
of the examination permitted by Rule 26 (b), but in such event will
be subject to the protective orders set forth in subdivision (b) of
this Rule 45.
(2) A resident of the district in which the deposition is to be
taken may be required to attend an examination only in the county
wherein he resides or is employed or transacts his business in per-
son, or at such other convenient place as is fixed by an order of
court. A nonresident of the district may be required to attend only
in the county wherein he is served with a subpoena, or within 40
miles from the place of service, or at such other convenient place as
is fixed by an order of court.
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The change in Rule 45 (b) which adds "tangible things" to the list
of which may be covered by subpoena duces tecum and the new sentence
in Rule 45 (d)(1), except the last clause thereof, conform these rules to
Rule 26 (b). Such a change would be commendable, for it will liberalize
these rules and result in greater uniformity between them and Rule 26.
The addition to Rule 45 (b) (1) of the words "or modify" is advisable,
as a court may feel that a subpoena, which, in its original form, is unreason-
able and oppressive, can be imodified to be ieasonable and fair. As the rule
now reads, an unreasonable, oppressive subpoena must be quashed.
The suggested deletion from Rule 45 (d)(1) of the sentence requir-
ing a court order for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum on the taking
of a deposition seems logical. Such an order is not required when a similar
subpoena is issued to obtain evidence at a trial,7 4 and there is no substantial
reason for any difference in procedure in obtaining a subpoena to procure
evidence at a trial or by deposition. Further, the requirement of a court
order has been criticized by some district judges as unnecessary and oppres-
sive.75
The final clause of the sentence that it is suggested should be added
to Rule 45 (d)(1) permits the granting of protective orders referred to
in Rule 45 (b)(1) and (2). This is wise, since there is no substantial dif-
ference between the issuing of subpoenas in connection with the taking of
depositions and in the presenting of evidence at trials.
At present, under Rule 45 (d)(2), there is no flexibility concerning
the place at which the resident of a district in which a deposition is to be
taken may be required to attend an examination, whereas the court may
order attendance of a nonresident at any place within its jurisdiction. The
first change proposed in this rule would provide flexibility therein by per-
mitting the court to require attendance of a resident "at such other con-
venient place as is fixed by, an order of court." The second change would
require that any place at which a court order demanded a nonresident's
attendance for the taking of a deposition should be "convenient." This
probably spells out the practical effect of the present law, but, under a
literal interpretation of the rule, a court can now designate a place for the
taking of a deposition which is inconvenient for a nonresident deponent.
(To be continued)
74. FED. RULES CIV. PROC., Rule 45 (a).
75. Second Preliminary Draft, p. 53.
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